Chapter 2
Literature Review

INTRODUCTION

Pacification, nation building, stability operations, counterinsurgency opera-tions – these are all various names for the activities a victorious military force finds itself undertaking at the cessation of hostilities. This is especially true of the belligerents in a civil war. The international community steps in in an effort to contain the hostilities and deliver humanitarian aid to the refugee population that is inevitably created by the hostilities. Frequently the outcome of a war cannot truly be known for several years after the guns have fallen silent. Does the defeated state rebuild its capacity for governance and join with its former antagonist in peaceful and mutually prosperous relations or does it descend into the Hobbesian hell of a failed nation state; a pariah to the world community? There have been examples of errors made by victors, such as the Treaty of Versailles, that have set the stage for future conflicts that have lessons applicable to humanitarian interventions initiated by the international community.

BACKGROUND

A lack of empathy, driven by greed, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding can lead to Tuchman's (1969) definition of folly. The different approaches, one approach showing empathy and a respect for the change capacity of a vanquished foe, the other showing the opposite, can be found in the handling

of Germany in the twentieth century. The vengeful stance that the Allies took with Germany after World War I is frequently cited as the casus belli for World War II by setting the conditions that allowed Hitler's rise to power (Van Meter, 1979). But then after World War II, Germany (at least West Germany) had a completely different outcome.

The historic postwar transition effects on societies have been almost as traumatic as the lethal portion of the battles themselves. At the end of World War I, the victorious Allies came together at Versailles Palace in Paris to hammer out a peace treaty, the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty has historically been seen as a disaster as far as actually making peace. Given the costs paid by the Allies, both in blood and treasure and the mood of their respective electorates, the ability of the 'Big Three' democracies, Britain, France, and the United States, to make peace based upon reciprocity, was very low. The United States had the additional difficulty that isolationism was a very strong sentiment during that time. So much of an isolationist sentiment was present that the United States never ratified the Treaty of Versailles or became a member of the League of Nations (Dockrill & Fisher, 2001).

The case of Germany after World War II was quite different than that existing after World War I. The main difference in the situation on the ground was that the Allies had invaded and were occupying Germany. Much of the German infrastructure had been destroyed and resources were scarce. Many members of the disarmed German army were attempting to be captured by the Allied forces because prisoners of war were allotted the same rations as Allied soldiers, which was much better than the civilian population were able to attain. There were also a great number of displaced persons and disbanded German army personnel (still under arms) walking around the countryside making for an uncomfortable security situation. The positive aspect of the security situation was that none of these worrisome groups were organizing into an insurgency. The main problem faced by the Allied occupation forces was crime and reestablishing civil order. Unfortunately, one of the situations that remained the same between the wars was the propensity of the United States to rapidly withdraw manpower assets from the theater due to the rapid demobilization of its military. This made the security circumstances then, as it has in the recent past, problematic for commanders attempting to conduct stability operations (United States Army History Archives, 1947).

Fortunately for many of the German people, the strife between the Soviet Union and the other Allies became an overriding consideration in the administration of postwar Germany. The fear of communism spreading coupled with the insistence of building a buffer zone by the Soviet Union at the end of the war begat the Marshall Plan for rebuilding postwar Europe. As the

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