A Game Theoretic Approach for Sensitive Information Sharing in Supply Chain

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Author(s): Xiaofeng Zhang (Hong Kong Baptist University, China), William K. Cheung (Hong Kong Baptist University, China), ZongWei Luo (The University of Hong Kong, China)and Frank Tong (Technologies Research Center, Hong Kong, China)
Copyright: 2012
Pages: 11
Source title: Cyber Crime: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications
Source Author(s)/Editor(s): Information Resources Management Association (USA)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-61350-323-2.ch603

Keywords: Digital Crime & Forensics / Information Science Reference / IT Security and Ethics / Security & Forensics

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Abstract

With the adoption of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, information sharing among participants in a supply chain is greatly facilitated, raising privacy concerns on sharing sensitive information. Balancing the conflicts between the improvement of visibility and the decrease of sensitive information shared is paramount. In this paper, the authors propose a leader-follower game model called LFM to model the strategic game between buyer and supplier. A Stackelberg equilibrium state is then computed as the solution to this game model. The proposed approach exhibits better performance when compared with conventional optimization approaches via derivation in terms of the total information sharing level and the total gain acquired verified by the experiments. In the future, the authors will extend this approach to a more complex situation with more participants in a dynamic environment.

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A Game Theoretic Approach for Sensitive Information Sharing in Supply Chain

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